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Abstract
Full-duplex (FD) communication is regarded as a key technology in future 5G
and Internet of Things (IoT) systems. In addition to high data rate constraints,
the success of these systems depends on the ability to allow for confidentiality
and security. Secret-key agreement from reciprocal wireless channels can be re-
garded as a valuable supplement for security at the physical layer. In this work, we
study the role of FD communication in conjunction with secret-key agreement. We
first introduce two complementary key generation models for FD and half-duplex
(HD) settings and compare the performance by introducing the key-reconciliation
function. Furthermore, we study the impact of the so called probing-reconciliation
trade-off, the role of a strong eavesdropper and analyze the system in the high SNR
regime. We show that under certain conditions, the FD mode enforces a deteriorat-
ing impact on the capabilities of the eavesdropper and offers several advantages
in terms of secret-key rate over the conventional HD setups. Our analysis reveals
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2as an interesting insight that perfect self-interference cancellation is not necessary
in order to obtain performance gains over the HD mode.
I. Introduction
The emerging deployment of devices with wireless connectivity in large
numbers — commonly referred to as the Internet of Things (IoT) — has
attracted significant attention in the research community. In IoT networks,
multiple nodes are allowed to interact with each other over a shared medium.
The communication between the nodes can be partitioned into two types,
namely, HD and FD modes. In HD mode, the transmitter and the receiver of
each node are constrained to share their resources, i.e., time or frequency. More
specifically, each node either listens to the transmission from the other nodes or
broadcasts its own information over the network. As opposed to the HDmode,
in the FD mode nodes can simultaneously transmit and receive information
on the same frequency band. From a practical viewpoint, a number of works
(see [2]–[4], for instance), have recently proposed functional prototypes of
FD systems. Due to the close proximity of the transmitter and the receiver
antennas, simultaneous transmission and reception of information emanates a
key issue of self-interference (SI). The characterization and cancellation of SI
is the main challenge in the practical implementation of FD systems [5].
Due to the openness of the wireless medium, the transmission between two
communicating parties can be overheard by other nodes in the network for
free. The leakage of information to unintended nodes in the network may
have serious consequences [6]. In his seminal work, Wyner introduced a basic
wiretap channel model [7] to study secrecy by taking the attributes of the
physical channel into account. A wiretap channel consists of three nodes,
two communicating users, i.e., Alice and Bob and an external Eavesdropper
(Eve) from whom the communication needs to be protected. In [7], Wyner
3characterized the secrecy capacity of this model, when the Alice-to-Bob link is
stronger than the Alice-to-Eve link. The wiretap channel is extended to study
a variety of multi-user settings, namely, the broadcast channel [8], [9], the
multi-access channel [10], the relay-eavesdropper channel [11] and the wiretap
channel with correlated sources [12]. For a review of these and other related
models, the interested reader may refer to [13] and references therein.
Alternatively, the confidential message can also be secured by the help
of secret-key agreement [14]. In key agreement systems, Alice encrypts the
message with the help of a secret key and broadcasts it over the network.
It is assumed that the secret key is available at only the legitimate nodes.
The legitimate user Bob knows the secret key and can easily decode the
confidential message. The unintended node, Eve, is unaware of the secret key
and hence is unable to decode the confidential message. From information-
theoretic viewpoint, Ahlswede et al. [15], and Maurer [16] study the problem of
secret-key agreement in bi-directional systems. They introduce the source-type
model, where all users observe information from jointly random sources. By
means of public communication, Alice and Bob utilize these sources in order
to harness an advantage over Eve [17]. The maximum rate at which the secret
keys can be generated reliably, securely, and uniformly, is called as secret-
key capacity. The source-type model study in [15] has gained much attention
in the research community and is extended to study a variety of channels,
namely, rate-limited public communication [18], [19], and with Gaussian vector
sources [20]. Recently, these works are generalized to product sources in [21].
In another related work [22], the secret-key rate of jointly Gaussian sources
under a quantization constraint is studied. A situation where Alice can control
the excitation of sources is considered in [23].
In practice, the main challenge in key agreement protocols is how to dis-
tribute the keys securely. In general, the channel states between two legitimate
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Fig. 1. The key agreement system model.
users, i.e., Alice-to-Bob and Bob-to-Alice is known to be largely reciprocal,
while the channel from both legitimate nodes to Eve is not the same. Due to the
lack of similar observations, Eve is unable to trace back the respective channel
states. Thus, Alice and Bob can utilize an advantage of common information to
distill a secret key which can be used to secure information [24]. Some practical
implementations, for example in [25]–[27], have demonstrated the feasibility
of this approach. From an information-theoretic viewpoint, the authors of [28],
[29] study the problem of key sharing by utilizing the leverage provided due
to the reciprocity of wireless channels and establish different methods for key
generation. Building on these works, in [30] the fundamental trade-off between
obtaining reciprocal CSI and randomness sharing is considered. In [31], the
authors establish bounds on secret-key agreement in a two-way relay setting
under active eavesdropping. As opposed to the previously mentioned results
in which systems only operate in the HD mode to generate secret keys, in this
work, we investigate this issue in the context of FD transmissions.
In this work, we study a model where three nodes Alice, Bob and Eve
are equipped with a single antenna each as shown in Figure 1, where Alice
and Bob interact between each other to establish a secret key that needs to
be concealed from Eve. We assume that the Eve is a passive eavesdropper
and only listens to the communication. The transmission protocol consists of
5two phases. In the first phase, Alice and Bob obtain common information by
probing and estimating the current state of their respective wireless channels.
In the second phase, Alice and Bob perform public communication under a
transmission rate constraint. The public communication by Alice is designed
as one-shot key reconciliation [17]. Recall that, in the HD scenario, the com-
munication nodes need to allocate distinct time or frequency resources for
transmission or reception. In contrast to this, the extension to FD is far from
straightforward. The main difficulty in FD mode arises due to occurrence of SI,
since the nodes can transmit and receive information over the same frequency
band.
We now summarize the main contributions of this work. We first intro-
duce the key-reconciliation function that serves as a metric to measure the
performance of both HD and FD systems. Next, we show that there exists a
fundamental trade-off between the channel probing and reconciliation phases.
We also study a special case of a strong eavesdropper, in which the Eve is
allowed to remove the contribution of receiver noise. We provide the region
under which the FD mode outperforms the HD mode. Finally, we also investi-
gate the asymptotic behavior of this model in high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
regimes. For this setup, we establish certain conditions that shed light on the
benefit of FD over HD mode. We illustrate our results with the help of some
numerical examples.
This paper is structured as follows. In section II, the system models of both
HD and FD modes are introduced. Section III defines the secret-key rate,
more specifically, the key-reconciliation function necessary for the evaluation
of the system performance. In section IV, the main contributions of this work
are discussed. Finally, section V concludes this paper by summarizing its
contribution.
Notation: We use following notations throughout this work. All vectors are
6denoted by small bold-face letter x, and matrices by capital bold-face letter X.
The operator exp denotes the exponential function, ln denotes the logarithm
with respect to base e, while log2 is used for base 2. We denote the matrix
transpose by (·)T, expectation with respect to a random variable x by Ex [·],
entropy by H(·), differential entropy by h(·), Euclidean distance by ‖·‖ and
ceiling operator by ⌈·⌉. The operator != allows equality of left and right operand.
The notation N (0, IN) denote a Gaussian random variable with zero-mean and
identity covariance matrix of order N ×N.
II. System model
We consider a key agreement model as shown in Figure 1. The system
model consists of three nodes, i.e., two legitimate nodes, Alice and Bob, and
an eavesdropper Eve, where each node is equipped with a single antenna.
The parameter hab is the channel which connects Alice-to-Bob and hba is the
channel which connects Bob-to-Alice. Furthermore, these two links may not
necessarily fully correlate with each other. The parameter hae is the channel
which connects Alice-to-Eve and hbe is the channel which connects Bob-to-Eve.
We assume that all channels comply with a real-valued flat-fading model. We
consider a block-fading environment where during one coherence block the
channel coefficients remain constant and change to independent realizations
in the next block. The key agreement protocol spans over n such blocks, and
is depicted in Figure 2. We assume that all interactions between Alice-to-Bob
and vice versa is authenticated by some means. In what follows, we elucidate
these two phases, i.e., probing and reconciliation phase, associated with HD
and FD modes.
Remark 1. In our system model, we consider an Eve with only one antenna. A
more capable Eve can, however, deploy multiple antennas in order to collect
more observations. Subsequently, Eve can perform some information fusion to
obtain a better estimate of the current channel state. For the sake of simplicity,
71 2 3 · · · βn βn+ 1 · · · n
Channel
coherence
block
Probing phase Reconciliation phase
Fig. 2. Key agreement protocol — Channel estimation by probing and subsequent phase for key
reconciliation by public communication.
we restrict ourselves to single antenna configuration, and emulate a stronger
Eve by allowing higher correlation of channel estimations to those of the
legitimate nodes.
A. Probing phase
In each block, Alice and Bob interact between each other to send pilot signals
to estimate the current realization of the channel. These signals are also known
to Eve. The probing phase consists of a total of βn blocks, 0 < β ≤ 1. In the
k-th block, Alice gets one observation xk ∈ R, Bob gets Ny observations in yk ∈
R
Ny×1, and Eve gets Nz observations in zk ∈ RNz×1. The choice of parameters Ny
and Nz, is selected based on the operating mode (HD or FD) of the system.
At the end of βn blocks, the independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
Gaussian multiple vector source observations at Alice, Bob and Eve, are given
by xβn, yβn and zβn, respectively.
81) HD mode
In HD mode, Ny := 1 and Nz := 2, i.e., y = y and z = (z1, z2)
T. The channel
observations in each block are given by
x =
√
snr hba + na, (1a)
y =
√
snr hab + nb, (1b)
z1 =
√
snrae hae + nae, (1c)
z2 =
√
snrbe hbe + nbe, (1d)
where the channel coefficients hi j, with i ∈ {a, b} and j ∈ {a, b, e}, i , j, are jointly
Gaussian random variables with zero mean and unit variance. The correlation
coefficients between different random variables are given by
E [haehbe] = ρe,
E [haehba] = ρae,
E [hbehba] = ρbe,
E [hbahab] = δρba. (2)
The parameter 0 < δ ≤ 1 captures the delay penalty that consecutive measure-
ments undergo in time-variant environments. This situation occurs when the
reply of Bob to Alice’s probing is already delayed further than the channel
coherence time. The additive noise term ni j is i.i.d. with ni j ∼ N (0, 1). The
signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) at the legitimate nodes and the links Alice-to-
Eve, Bob-to-Eve, are denoted by snr, snrae, and snrbe, respectively. Note that
the variances of both the channel and the noise variables are equal to one.
In order to account for different scenarios, the parameters snr, snrae and snrbe
can be chosen appropriately.
Remark 2. The legitimate nodes probe the channel once per coherence block.
Naturally, if the probing is repeated multiple times, the channel estimate is
9improved. However, in many communication standards, probing is primarily
realized by a known preamble once sent before the actual payload data is
transmitted. Thus, we assume that only one channel estimate per coherence
block is available.
2) FD mode
Next, we turn our attention to the FD mode. In this mode, Ny := 1, Nz := 1;
and, thus y = y and z = z. The channel observations in each block are given
by
x =
√
snr hba + α
√
snr nIa + na, (3a)
y =
√
snr hab + α
√
snr nIb + nb, (3b)
z =
√
snrae hae +
√
snrbe hbe + ne, (3c)
where nIa and nIb denote the residual SI induced by simultaneous transmission
and reception at Alice and Bob, respectively. This is due to the fact that, even
after SI cancellation, some portion of the strong transmitter noise may still be
present [5]. The parameter α denotes the strength of the residual SI compared
to the desired received signal, with α > 0, where α = 1 denotes the case when
the residual SI is on the same power level as the desired signal. The statistics
of the channel coefficients hi j hold verbatim as in the HD mode, except, that
the penalty of consecutive measurements is no longer relevant since we have
zero delay, i.e., E [hbahab] = ρba.
Remark 3. The channel observations in (3a) and (3b) assume that the residual
SI acts as independent noise. It is only linked to the transmitted signal by
the power level, i.e., the second-order moment. This is an approximation,
since the actual residual SI might still have some functional relationship to the
transmitted signal. However, in this model, we assume that the SI cancellation
is able to remove all parts of residual SI that depend on the transmitted signal
10
directly.
B. Reconciliation phase
In this phase Alice and Bob use the remaining (1 − β)n blocks to convey
public messages. Alice delivers information on the key reconciliation by the
message Ma ∈ M = {1, . . . , 2nRr} to help Bob in key generation. We briefly
discuss the role of the reconciliation, for details the reader may refer to [17].
During the probing phase, Alice and Bob obtain βn observations from channel
estimation. These observations are correlated, but may not be equal and there-
fore require some alignmentwhich can be done through public communication.
Subsequently, at the beginning of the reconciliation phase, Alice quantizes its
observation sequence and chooses a message for Bob as a function of the
quantized sequence in the spirit of Wyner-Ziv coding with side information
at the receiver [32]. Since the channel demands a rate constraint, the quality
of quantization allows to control the required reconciliation rate.
We now elaborate on the role of Bob. It is evident that FD capability is mean-
ingful only in the context of two-way communication. However, as mentioned
before, the reconciliation of Alice-to-Bob is a one-way transmission. In practical
situations, the transmissions should be designed in a two-way fashion to fully
utilize the leverage offered by FD transmission. Therefore, we assume that not
only Bob is receiving the key reconciliation message from Alice, it is allowed
to broadcasts a public message to another external node. We provide a simple
example to highlight the impact of this communication.
Example 1. Consider a setup for the 3-user key agreement system as shown in
Figure 3. This model consists of four nodes, three legitimate users Alice, Bob,
Charlie and the eavesdropper Eve. The key agreement protocol is depicted
in Figure 4 for the FD mode. We assume that during the probing phase, the
user pairs Alice-Bob and Bob-Charlie probe the channel in different coherence
11
Alice Bob
Eve
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Fig. 3. Example of reconciliation for 3-user key agreement.
Probing Phase Reconciliation Phase
Alice ⇐⇒ Bob
Bob ⇐⇒ Charlie
Alice =⇒ Bob
Bob =⇒ Charlie
Fig. 4. A sketch of the transmission protocol for the 3-user key agreement system.
blocks. Therefore, the observation sequences of Alice-Bob and Bob-Charlie
pairs are independent. In the reconciliation phase, Alice transmits the message
Ma to Bob, and, Bob sends Mb ∈ M = {1, . . . , 2nRr} to Charlie for key reconcilia-
tion. As a consequence, Bob is both transmitting and receiving information at
the same time in FD mode, or, in HD mode, by time-sharing. This argument
can be extended to the arbitrary large independent key agreement networks.
For the sake of simplicity, we restrict ourselves to a single setup of key agree-
ment. The ingredients that remain crucial are that Bob is actively using the
transmitter while receiving the reconciliation message from Alice. Thus, the
Alice-to-Bob link achieves the reconciliation rate Rr as
Rr ≥ 1
n
H(Ma). (4)
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We assume that Bob has only imperfect CSI available. Thus, the communi-
cation for reconciliation cannot achieve the capacity of a fast-fading channel
with perfect CSI [33], but rather a lower bound on it.
1) HD mode
At Bob, the channel input-output relationship is given by
yr = habxr + nr, (5)
where xr ∼ N (0, snr) is independent of hab, and nr ∼ N (0, 1). We define hˆab
as the part of the channel state that the receiver estimates by minimum-mean
squared error (MMSE) estimation. The variance of the estimation error is given
by
σ2HD = 1 −
E
[
habyr
]2
E
[
y2r
] = 1
1 + snr
. (6)
2) FD mode
Recall that, since Bob is transmitting and receiving at the same time, in FD
mode the communication is subjected to self-interference, and thus Bob re-
ceives
yr = habxr + α
√
snr nIr + nr, (7)
where xr ∼ N (0, snr), nIr ∼ N (0, 1) is the residual noise after interference
cancellation and nr ∼ N (0, 1) is independent additive white Gaussian noise.
The receiver obtains imperfect channel knowledge by MMSE from probing
in the same manner as in the HD case. The variance of the estimation error
yields
σ2FD =
1 + α2 snr
1 + snr(1 + α2)
. (8)
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C. Key generation
Following the probing and reconciliation phase, Alice computes a secret
key Ka ∈ K from the observations xβn, where K = {1, . . . , 2nRsk} denotes a finite
alphabet set and Rsk is the secret-key rate. From the public message Ma and
the observations yβn, Bob obtains a key Kb ∈ K , while Eve tries to reconstruct
the key from observations zβn and the public message Ma. The performance
is measured by the probability of error
lim
n→∞
Pr {Ka , Kb} = 0, (9)
and both strong uniformity and secrecy [34, p. 116]
lim
n→∞
[
log2⌈2nRsk⌉ −H
(
Ka|Ma, zβn
)]
= 0. (10)
For arbitrarily large n, the secret-key rate Rsk is achievable, if (9) and (10) are
satisfied.
Definition 1. The secret-key rate Rsk with respect to a certain reconciliation
rate Rr, is denoted by the key-reconciliation function Rsk (Rr).
III.Computation of Secret Key Rates
In this section, we derive the secret-key rates that serve as a metric for
performance evaluation.
A. Reconciliation rates
First, we provide the description to compute the reconciliation rate expres-
sion for both HD and FD modes. We consider a public transmission from
Alice to Bob during the reconciliation phase. This communication utilizes the
leverage offered by FD capability, since the link Alice-to-Bob obtains a rate
improvement by a factor of one-half compared to HD mode [35].
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1) HD mode
For the HD mode in (5), the reconciliation rate per block between Alice-to-Bob
channel is given by
RHDr =
(
1 − β)
2
I(xr; yr|hˆab), (11)
where the factor of one-half represents the resource share in HD mode.
In what follows, we provide an upper bound on the reconciliation rate of (11).
We can write
I(xr; yr|hˆab)
(a)≤ I(xr; yr|hab)
=
1
2
Ehab
[
log2
(
1 + h2ab snr
)]
, (12)
where (a) follows since conditioning reduces entropy. Subsequently, by plug-
ging (12) into (11), we get
RHDr ≤
1 − β
4
Ehab
[
log2
(
1 + h2ab snr
)]
(b)≤ 1 − β
4
log2
(
1 + Ehab
[
h2ab
]
snr
)
=
1 − β
4
log2 (1 + snr) =: R
HD
r , (13)
where (b) follows from Jensen’s inequality [36, p. 27].
2) FD mode
In contrast to HD mode, with FD capabilities Bob does not need to split
frequency or time resources. Thus, the Alice-to-Bob link is able to support
twice the rate compared to the HD mode. The supported reconciliation rate
per block between Alice-to-Bob channel is given by
RFDr =
(
1 − β) I(xr; yr|hˆab). (14)
From (14), we get
I(xr; yr|hˆab) = h(xr) − h(xr|yr, hˆab). (15)
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The right-hand side term in (15) can be bounded as
h(xr|yr, hˆab) (c)= h(xr − cyr|yr, hˆab)
(d)≤ h(xr − cyr|hˆab)
(e)≤ 1
2
Ehˆab
[
log2
(
(2pie) Var
[
xr − cyr|hˆab
])]
, (16)
where (c) follows since adding a constant with c > 0 does not change entropy,
(d) follows due to the fact that conditioning reduces entropy; and, (e) follows
because Gaussian distribution maximizes conditional entropy for a fixed vari-
ance. The quantity Var
[
xr − cyr|hˆab
]
is given by
Var
[
xr − cyr|hˆab
]
=
snr
(
1 + snr(σ2
FD
+ α2)
)
1 + snr(σ2
FD
+ α2 + hˆ2
ab
)
, (17)
where c is chosen by minimizing the mean-square error (MSE) when estimat-
ing xr from yr, and is
c =
hˆab snr
1 + snr(σ2
FD
+ α2 + hˆ2
ab
)
. (18)
Then, by plugging (17) in (16), and replacing it in (15), we get
I(xr; yr|hˆab) ≥ 1
2
Ehˆab
[
log2
(
1 + hˆ2ab
snr(1 + snr(1 + α2))
1 + 2 snr+α snr(1 + snr)
)]
. (19)
Finally, the reconciliation rate for FD is given by
RFDr ≥
1 − β
2
Ehˆab
[
log2
(
1 + cFDhˆ
2
ab
)]
(20)
where for convenience, we set
cFD :=
snr(1 + snr(1 + α2))
1 + 2 snr+α snr(1 + snr)
. (21)
We can further bound (20) as follows.
RFDr ≥
1 − β
2
Ehˆab
[
log2
(
1 + cFD exp
(
ln hˆ2ab
))]
( f )
≥ 1 − β
2
log2
(
1 + cFD exp
(
Ehˆab
[
ln hˆ2ab
]))
, (22)
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where ( f ) follows due to the fact that f (x) = log2 (1 + ce
x) is a convex func-
tion [37]. The expectation over Ehˆab
[
ln hˆ2
ab
]
yields
Ehˆab
[
ln hˆ2ab
]
=
1√
2piσ2
hˆab
∫
R
ln x2 exp
− x
2
2σ2
hˆab
dx
(g)
= lnσ2
hˆab
+
1√
2pi
∫
R
ln y2 exp
(
− y
2
2
)
dy
(h)
= ln σ2
hˆab
+Ψ (0.5) + ln 2
(i)
= ln
σ2
hˆab
2
− γ. (23)
where (g) holds due to the substitution x = σhˆy, (h) follows because the integral
can be solved in closed form [38] and is given by the Digamma function Ψ(x),
and (i) follows from the Euler-Mascheroni constant γ ≈ 0.57721. Replacing (23)
in (22), we get
RFDr ≥
1 − β
2
log2
1 + cFD
σ2
hˆab
2
e−γ

( j)
=
1 − β
2
log2
(
1 +
1
2
e−γ
snr2
1 + 2 snr+α2 snr(1 + snr)
)
=: RFD
r
, (24)
where ( j) follows since
σ2
hˆab
= 1 − σ2FD =
snr
1 + α2 snr+ snr
.
B. Secret-key rates
We now provide the secret-key rate for the Gaussian sources with rate-
limited public communication for key reconciliation.
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Proposition 1. Let Alice, Bob and Eve observe a zero-mean Gaussian multiple
vector source (x, y˜, z˜)
y˜ = bx +wy, (25a)
z˜ = ex +wz, (25b)
where b ∈ RNy , e ∈ RNz , x ∼ N (0, σ2x), wy ∼ N (0, INy) and wz ∼ N (0, INz),
and recall that β denotes the ratio of coherence blocks available for collecting
reciprocal channel states at each node. Then, the rate region (Rsk,Rr) is the
union of all achievable rate pairs satisfying
Rr ≥
β
2
log2
σ2x
σ2
x|u
− β
2
log2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
INy + bb
Tσ2x
INy + bb
Tσ2
x|u
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ , (26a)
Rsk ≤
β
2
log2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
INy + bb
Tσ2x
INy + bb
Tσ2
x|u
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ −
β
2
log2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
INz + ee
Tσ2x
INz + ee
Tσ2
x|u
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ , (26b)
for some σ2x ≥ σ2x|u > 0, where σ2x|u denotes the conditional covariance of x given
a (Gaussian) random variable u.
Proof: The proof of (26) follows along similar lines as in [20, Section V]
and is omitted for brevity.
Next, we provide a useful proposition that is used to establish the results in
this work.
Proposition 2. There exist non-singular matrices Ay ∈ RNy×Ny , Az ∈ RNz×Nz , for
which the achievable rate region (Rr,Rsk) defined in (26a) and (26b), also holds
for (1) and (3), respectively.
Proof: The computation of the achievable rate region in (26) for the model (25)
depends on joint probability distributions only through marginals (x,y) and
(x, z) [19, Appendix C]. Let y¯ and z¯ be the Gaussian random variables with
the same second-order moments as y and z, respectively, and the same joint
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statistics with x. In what follows, we elaborate the connection between z¯ and
z. Similar arguments can be used to show the relationship between y¯ and y
and is omitted. Let
z¯ := Azz˜ = Azex +Azwz, (27)
where Az ∈ RNz×Nz is non-singular. Since Az is invertible, the transformation
Azz˜ provides a sufficient statistic and is information lossless. Subsequently,
we need the same joint and second-order marginal statistics of z and z¯, i.e.,
σzx = E [zx]
!
= E [z¯x] = Azeσ
2
x, (28)
and
Σz = E
[
zzT
]
!
= E
[
z¯z¯T
]
= Aze
(
σ2xAze
)T
+AzA
T
z
= σ−2x σzxσ
T
zx +AzA
T
z . (29)
From (29), we get
AzA
T
z = Σz − σzxσ−2x σTzx =: Σz|x. (30)
Remark 4. By construction, Σz, Σz|x have to be positive semi-definite matrices.
However, in order to satisfy the conditions of Proposition 2, we also need to
exclude all the cases where Σz, Σz|x have at least one eigenvalue of zero.
The next step is to compute the parameter vectors b and e. We now provide
the computation of ‖e‖2. The computation of ‖b‖2 follows analogously and is
19
omitted. Starting from (28), the squared norm of the e is given by
‖e‖2 = σ−4x σTzx
(
AzA
T
z
)−1
σzx
(a)
= σ−4x σ
T
zx
(
Σz − σzxσ−2x σTzx
)−1
σzx
(b)
= σ−4x σ
T
zx
(
Σ
−1
z
+Σ−1
z
σzx
(
σ2x − σTzxΣ−1z σzx
)−1
σT
zxΣ
−1
z
)
σzx
= σ−2x
σT
zxΣ
−1
z
σzx
σ2x − σTzxΣ−1z σzx
, (31)
where (a) follows from (30) and (b) is due to the Woodbury identity [39, eq.
(156)].
Following steps similar to as shown above, ‖b‖2 is given by
‖b‖2 = σ−2x
σT
yxΣ
−1
y
σyx
σ2x − σTyxΣ−1y σyx
. (32)
C. Key-reconciliation function
The following proposition provides the secret-key rate as a function of
reconciliation rate.
Proposition 3. The key-reconciliation function is given by
Rsk(Rr) =
β
2
log2
1 − 4−Rrβ (‖bx‖2 − ‖ex‖2) + ‖bx‖2
1 + ‖ex‖2 . (33)
Proof: We begin the proof by first considering Rr — the minimum possible
reconciliation rate in (26a) and define
‖bx‖2 = σ2x‖b‖2, (34a)
‖ex‖2 = σ2x‖e‖2. (34b)
From the determinant identity [39, eq. (24)], we know that
∣∣∣INy + bbTσ2x|u∣∣∣ = 1 + σ2x|u‖b‖2. (35)
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Subsequently, from (26a), we get
σ2x|u =
σ2x
4Rr/β (1 + ‖bx‖2) − ‖bx‖2 . (36)
Finally, by plugging (36) into (26b) and repetitively using the determinant
identity [39, eq. (24)], we get (33).
From Proposition 3, we deduce the following property.
Property 1. The key-reconciliation function Rsk(Rr) is positive if and only if
(i) Rr > 0,
(ii) ‖bx‖2 > ‖ex‖2.
Proof: Let Rsk(Rr) > 0, i.e., the numerator term inside log function in (33)
must be larger than the denominator. This implies that
4−Rr/β(‖bx‖2 − ‖ex‖2) < ‖bx‖2 − ‖ex‖2.
The exponential term is always smaller or equal to one due to the non-
negativity of reconciliation rate, therefore the inequality can only be fulfilled
if ‖bx‖2 > ‖ex‖2 and Rr > 0. Conversely, assuming the conditions (i) and (ii) are
satisfied, then one can strictly lower bound (33) by removing the exponential
term, which in turn yields Rsk(Rr) > 0.
Next, we establish the appropriate representations for the key-reconciliation
function for both HD and FD modes.
1) HD mode
For HD mode (1), we denote the key-reconciliation function as RHD
sk
. The
computation of RHD
sk
follows along similar lines as in (33) with the specific
choice of parameters
∥∥∥eHDx ∥∥∥2, and ∥∥∥bHDx ∥∥∥2. This leads to
RHDsk
(
RHDr
) (a)≤ RHDsk
(
R
HD
r
)
=: R
HD
sk , (37)
where (a) follows due to (13). Details on the computation of the parameters∥∥∥eHDx ∥∥∥2, and ∥∥∥bHDx ∥∥∥2, are relegated to Appendix A-1.
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2) FD mode
In FD mode (3), the key-reconciliation function is denoted by RFD
sk
. The com-
putation of RFD
sk
follows along similar lines as in (33) with the specific choice
of parameters
∥∥∥eFDx ∥∥∥2 and ∥∥∥bFDx ∥∥∥2. Subsequently, we get
RFDsk
(
RFDr
) (b)≥ RFDsk
(
RFD
r
)
=: RFD
sk
, (38)
where (b) follows from (24). The computation of the parameters
∥∥∥eFDx ∥∥∥2, and∥∥∥bFDx ∥∥∥2, is provided in Appendix A-2.
Remark 5. The particular structure of bounds in (37) and (38) provides the
worst-case performance gains between the FD and HD mode, i.e., RFDsk − R
HD
sk .
IV. Main Results and Discussion
In this section, we present our main results by comparing the performance
of HD and FD approaches. We first define a metric which we refer to as im-
provement ratio, that shows the performance gain of FD over HD approaches.
Typically, the upgrade from HD to FD capability requires some extra hardware
at transceivers [40]. Therefore, the improvement of FD mode over HD has to
be quite significant in order to justify the additional expenses.
Definition 2. The FD over HD improvement ratio η and its lower bound η are
given by
η =
RFD
sk
− RHD
sk
RHD
sk
≥ η := R
FD
sk − R
HD
sk
R
HD
sk
, (39)
where RFD
sk
, 0 and RFDsk ≥ R
HD
sk .
Figure 5 shows examples of secret-key rate and improvement ratio. We fix
parameters to ρae = ρbe = ρe = 0.4, ρ2ba = 1, δ = 0.97 and β = 0.5. In this
example, we set snrae = snrbe = snr for the following reason — If the legitimate
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nodes increase their transmit powers when they exchange pilots, then Eve
benefits likewise in terms of snr. Therefore, if Eve has finite snrae and snrbe, it
is reasonable to assume that both snrae, and snrbe are proportional to snr.
We show the FD rates (38) for different values of α ∈ {−10,−17,−20} dB.
Fig. 5b illustrates improvement ratio (39) versus snr for α ∈ {−17,−20} dB.
The Figure 5a shows the significance of self-interference cancellation, since
we only achieve some improvement of FD over HD mode, if α ≪ 1. For
α = −10 dB, the HD mode performs better than the FD mode. However,
perfect cancellation is not necessary in order to justify the FD setup, and
therefore secret-key generation in FD mode is attractive even if the methods
for interference cancellation have low complexity.
Remark 6. Such nodes that are equipped with FD capability can always use
the HD mode as a fallback solution. Therefore, a node in FD mode technically
never performs worse than a node with HDmode only and effectively achieves
max
(
RHD
sk
,RFD
sk
)
.
A. Probing-reconciliation trade-off
Recall from Figure 2 that the probing and reconciliation phases are sharing
n coherence blocks, where the parameter β captures the resource trade-off
between the time duration of two phases. Next, we show that there exists
an optimal β for which the secret-key rate is maximized. From the system
designer viewpoint, this value is especially relevant since — except for the
input power — all other system parameters are difficult to change.
Property 2. For any 0 < β < 1 and a reconciliation rate Rp = (1 − β)r˜p, where
(i) r˜p is independent of β,
(ii) ‖bx‖2 > ‖ex‖2,
(iii) Rr > 0,
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Fig. 5. Secret-key rates (a) from bounded equivalents of HD (37), and FD modes (38); and, (b)
improvement ratios (39) for different values of snr at the legitimate users and snrae = snrbe = snr
for the eavesdropper. The other parameters are set to ρae = ρbe = ρe = 0.4, ρ2ba = 1, δ = 0.97 and β = 0.5.
the key-reconciliation function Rsk(Rr) is strictly concave with respect to β.
Proof: The key-reconciliation function of (33) has a extreme point within
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0 < β < 1 and its second derivative is given by
∂2Rsk
∂β2
= − 2 ln r˜p4
r˜p
(
1+ 1β
)
(‖bx‖2 − ‖ex‖2)(1 + ‖bx‖2)
β3
[
4r˜p(‖bx‖2 − ‖ex‖2) − 4
r˜p
β (1 + ‖bx‖2)
]2 < 0.
The second derivative is negative for all β, which proves the concavity of (33)
with respect to β.
Figure 6 illustrates an example of the optimal β∗ as a function of snr. The
optimal β∗ for HD and FD mode are obtained by maximizing R
HD
sk (37) and
RFDsk (38) with respect to β. It can be clearly seen from Figure 6 that it is more
beneficial to proportionally increase the number of channel estimates at higher
snr. In this regime, the channel supports enhanced reconciliation rates at
higher snr, and therefore the constraint of (26a) is more relaxed. This trend can
be observed for both HD and FDmodes. The optimal β∗ is linearly increasing in
HD mode at higher snr. This implies that, there is no need of further investing
into reconciliation, since the reconciliation rate gets unbounded with respect to
snr. In the case of FD mode, however, the reconciliation rate is impeded by self-
interference and therefore limited for high snr and accordingly, β∗ approaches
a saturation point.
Remark 7. The proper choice of parameters like ρba or δ might not be trivial,
since they largely depend on the environment where the system is deployed;
and, also on the properties of the node’s transceivers. However, as many
HD implementations (for instance [41]) have shown, the channel reciprocity
represented by δρba is usually very high. Likewise, in all of our examples, we
assume that δ is close to one.
B. Strong eavesdropper
The strong secrecy condition (10) guarantees security against an Eve with
unlimited computational power. However, in a practical system, Eve has more
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Fig. 6. Depiction of optimal allocation β∗ of channel estimation and reconciliation resources for different
values of the snr at the legitimate users where snrae = snrbe = snr for the eavesdropper. The other
parameters are chosen as ρba = 1, δ = 0.95, ρae = ρbe = ρe = 0.4 and α = −15 dB.
options. For instance, Eve can obtain equipment that provides almost noise-
free reception of signals. Furthermore, even a passive Eve is able to change
the position in the environment. Thus, Eve can evoke certain channel statistics
that are more favorable for eavesdropping. In this sub-section, we consider a
special setting that models the worst-case scenario, where we assume that
the receiver noise is negligible at Eve, i.e., nae = nbe = ne := 0; and, provide
regions under which a positive secret-key rate is achievable. For convenience,
we define the parameter ξ :=
√
snrbe/snrae, that denotes the ratio of channel
strengths between Bob-to-Eve and Alice-to-Eve links.
We first digress to provide a property which is useful to establish the results
in this sub-section.
Property 3. The key-reconciliation function Rsk(Rr) (33) is strictly monotonically
decreasing with respect to ‖ex‖2.
Proof: The first derivative of Rsk(Rr) (33) with respect to ‖ex‖2 does not yield
extreme points as necessary condition of local extrema. After some straight-
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forward algebra, by taking the second derivative
∂2Rsk
∂(‖ex‖2)2 =
(1 + ‖bx‖2)
(
1 − 4−Rrβ
) [
1 + 4−
Rr
β (1 + 2‖ex‖2) + ‖bx‖2
(
1 − 4−Rrβ
)]
(1 + ‖ex‖2)2
[
1 + 4−
Rr
β ‖ex‖2 + ‖bx‖2
(
1 − 4−Rrβ
)]2 > 0,
(40)
it can be readily seen that (40) is positive for all ‖ex‖2, which yields the desired
result.
Next, we provide the regions under which the legitimate nodes experience
the best or the worst situations.
1) HD mode
In this section, we first compute
∥∥∥eHDx ∥∥∥2 and later on provide the region under
which positive secrecy rate is achievable. The computation of
∥∥∥eHDx ∥∥∥2 follows
along similar lines as shown in Appendix A-1 and is given by
∥∥∥eHDx ∥∥∥2 = snr(ρ
2
ae + ρ
2
be
− 2ρeρaeρbe)
(1 + snr)(1 − ρ2e ) − snr(ρ2ae + ρ2be − 2ρeρaeρbe)
. (41)
According to (30), the covariance matrix of Eve given the observations at Alice
is
Σz|x :=

Σ11 Σ12
Σ21 Σ22
 (42)
with entries
Σ11 = snrae
(
1 − snr
1 + snr
ρ2ae
)
,
Σ12 = Σ21 =
√
snrae snrbe
(
ρe − snr
1 + snr
ρaeρbe
)
,
Σ22 = snrbe
(
1 − snr
1 + snr
ρ2be
)
,
which needs to satisfy the positive definite matrix condition.1
1A matrix is positive definite, if all leading principal minors are positive. Let A be a n × n matrix. A
k×k sub matrix is constructed by deleting the last n−k columns and rows from A. The leading principal
minor of order k is the determinant of that submatrix.
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Definition 3. For a fixed snr, the regionAHDz denotes all 4-tuples
(
ρae, ρbe, ρe, ξ
) ∈
[−1, 1] × [−1, 1] × [−1, 1] × (0,∞) that satisfy2
1 − ρ2e −
snr
1 + snr
(
ρ2ae + ρ
2
be − 2ρaeρbeρe
)
> 0. (43)
Proof: The region AHDz in Definition 3 follows by computing the determi-
nant of (42).
2) FD mode
In this section, we first compute the
∥∥∥eFDx ∥∥∥2 and later on provide the region
under which positive secret-key rate is achievable. The computation of
∥∥∥eFDx ∥∥∥2
is given by
∥∥∥eFDx ∥∥∥2 = snr(ρae + ξρbe)
2
(1 + ξ2 + 2ξρe)(1 + snr(1 + α2)) − snr(ρae + ξρbe)2 . (44)
The covariance matrix (30) yields
Σz|x = snr
(
1 + ξ2 + 2ξρe
)
− snr(ρae + ξρbe)
2
1 + snr(1 + α2)
. (45)
Definition 4. For fixed snr and α, the regionAFDz denotes all 4-tuples
(
ρae, ρbe, ρe, ξ
) ∈
[−1, 1] × [−1, 1] × [−1, 1] × (0,∞) that satisfy
1 + ξ2 + 2ξρe − snr
1 + snr(1 + α2)
(
ρae + ξρbe
)2 > 0. (46)
Proof: The region defined in Definition 4 follows straightforwardly from (45).
From the Definitions 3 and 4 — the feasible region Az — is then given by
Az = AHDz ∩ AFDz . Figure 7 shows an example of the typical feasible region
where the meshes denote the outer boundaries of the region. We now discuss
two situations where the legitimate nodes experience best or worst secret-key
rates. The best case occurs if Eve has minimal knowledge of the channel state
2Note the parameter ξ =
√
snrbe/snrae is added in order to enable the intersection to the corresponding
region in the FD mode.
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Fig. 7. Example of feasible region Az for ξ = 1 and fixed parameters α = −20 dB, snr = 10 dB. The
arrow points to a specific 3-tuple of
(
ρae, ρbe, ρe
)
that is referred to later in Figure 8b.
of Bob-to-Alice link. Recall from Property 3 that the secrecy rate Rsk(Rr) in (33)
is maximized, by minimizing the ‖ex‖2. The best case in terms of secret-key
rate trivially happens with ρae = ρbe = 0 in both modes. In this case, since
there is no correlation between the Alice-to-Bob and Alice-to-Eve links and
vice versa; thus, Eve is unable to get any information about the secret key.
In addition to this, it is interesting to note that there are some other useful
situations in which positive secret-key rates are achievable. In HD mode, a
maximum of secret-key rate is attained if ρae = ρeρbe holds with fixed ρe, and
ρbe, or symmetrically, if ρbe = ρeρae holds with fixed ρe, and ρae. In FD mode,∥∥∥eFDx ∥∥∥2 vanishes if ρae = −ξρbe holds. This follows due to the fact that Eve only
obtains the superposition of observations from Alice-to-Eve and Bob-to Eve
links, which can nullify the overall observation at Eve.
In contrast to the above, the worst case happens if Eve has occupied the most
favorable condition for eavesdropping by maximizing ‖ex‖2 in (33), which in
turn reduces the secret key rate. In HD mode, it can be readily shown that∥∥∥eHDx ∥∥∥2 is convex with respect to the tuple (ρae, ρbe), so the maximum lies at
the boundary of the feasible region defined in Definition 3. In the case of FD
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Fig. 8. Improvement of FD over HD mode for parameters ξ = 1, α = −15 dB, snr = 10 dB, ρ2
ba
= δ = 1
and β = 0.5, measured in bits/observation. The arrow in (b) denotes the point where the maximum value
is achieved. The corresponding 3-tuple of
(
ρae, ρbe, ρe
)
is marked by the arrow in Figure 7.
mode, one can deduce a similar conclusion from (44) and Definition 4.
Figure 8 shows the impact of different choices of ρe, ρae, and ρbe on the
RFDsk − R
HD
sk term, i.e., the improvement of FD over HD mode. Recall that the
parameter ρe denotes the mutual correlation of channels Alice-to-Eve and Bob-
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Fig. 9. Improvement of FD over HD mode for parameters ρe = 0.2, ρbe = −0.4, α = −15 dB, snr = 10 dB,
ρ2
ba
= δ = 1 and β = 0.5.
to-Eve. It also comprises statistical correlation that is not related to the Alice-
to-Bob link. As it can be seen from Figure 8a, the FD system offers the most
advantage if the correlation coefficients ρae and ρbe have different signs. Due to
the superposition of observations from Alice-to-Eve and Bob-to-Eve links, for
ρe < 0 they are more likely to cancel each other. If we have ρe > 0 as depicted
in Figure 8b, the observations are likely to add constructively, and therefore
significant improvement of FD over HD mode is only apparent if the values
of ρae and ρbe are close to zero. Figure 9 shows the impact of ξ and ρae on
the difference of secret-key rates. For numerical tractability, we show it with
fixed ρbe and ρe. The maximum gain is obtained when ξ ≈ 5 dB. As mentioned
before, ρae = −ξρbe minimizes
∥∥∥eFDx ∥∥∥2 in FD mode. Again, the FD mode is most
beneficial if the correlation coefficients ρae and ρbe have opposite signs.
C. High SNR
In this sub-section, we examine the case for arbitrarily high SNR at both the
legitimate nodes and at the eavesdropper, where we ignore the contribution
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of noise at each node. For simplicity of analysis, we assume that
1) The eavesdropper experiences symmetric observations, i.e., ρae = ρbe
2) The users are able to perfectly cancel any self-interference, i.e., α = 0.
We now provide a proposition that shows that under which conditions the
FD mode performs better than HD mode.
Proposition 4. The improvement ratio η > 0 of the FD over HD mode in the
high SNR regime holds, if the following relations are satisfied
δ2ρ2ba >
2ρ2ae
1 + ρe − 2ρ2ae
, (47)
ρe < 1. (48)
Proof: We begin the proof as follows. In order to obtain a positive secret-
key rate, we need to fulfill only Property 1-(ii), i.e.,
∥∥∥bHDx ∥∥∥2 > ∥∥∥eHDx ∥∥∥2, since
Property 1-(i) always holds because of insignificant contribution of noise. By
appropriately computing the parameters
∥∥∥bHDx ∥∥∥2 and ∥∥∥eHDx ∥∥∥2 along similar lines
as shown in (54) and (58) from Appendix A, we get
δ2ρ2
ba
1 − δ2ρ2
ba
>
2ρ2ae
1 + ρe − 2ρ2ae
. (49)
The term in (47) then follows by lower bounding the LHS of (49).
We next bound the inequality (48) as follows. Recall that the improvement
requirement η > 0 implies that RFDsk > R
HD
sk . Starting from (37) and (38), we get
1 +
∥∥∥bHDx ∥∥∥2
1 +
∥∥∥eHDx ∥∥∥2
>
1 +
∥∥∥bFDx ∥∥∥2
1 +
∥∥∥eFDx ∥∥∥2
. (50)
Subsequently, by plugging (54), (58), (59) and (60) from Appendix A into (50),
we obtain
1 + ρe
(1 − ρ2
ba
)(1 + ρe − 2ρ2ae)
>
(1 + ξ2 + 2ρeξ)
(1 − δ2ρ2
ba
)
[
(1 + ξ2 + 2ρeξ) − ρ2ae(1 + ξ)2
] . (51)
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Then (51) can be written as
(1 − δ2ρ2
ba
)
(1 − ρ2
ba
)
(1 + ρe)
(1 + ρe − 2ρ2ae)
>
(1 + ξ2 + 2ρeξ)[
(1 + ξ2 + 2ρeξ) − ρ2ae(1 + ξ)2
] . (52)
Next, by lower bound the term on the LHS in (52) we get
1 + ρe
1 + ρe − 2ρ2ae
>
(1 + ξ2 + 2ρeξ)
(1 + ξ2 + 2ρeξ) − ρ2ae(1 + ξ)2
. (53)
Finally, by rearranging (53) with respect to ρe, we get (48). Note that for the
special cases ξ = 1 and ρae = 0, R
FD
sk > R
HD
sk is always fulfilled.
Remark 8. The condition (47) ensures that some advantage of the legitimate
users over the eavesdropper exists. Without self-interference and delay penalty,
i.e., α = 0 and δ = 1, FD almost always performs better than HD mode, which
has already been observed in the literature [30].
V. Summary
In this work, we studied a secret-key generation setup for reciprocal wireless
channels for nodes with half-duplex (HD) and full-duplex (FD) capabilities.
We first developed a system model that captured the channel probing as well
as the public communication overhead required for key reconciliation. Next,
we established a key-reconciliation function that is used as a metric for com-
parison between HD and FD modes. The analysis revealed the improvements
in secret-key rate in FD mode over the HD mode even under the impact of
self-interference. We analyzed the probing-reconciliation trade-off, which holds
an optimal solution in both modes. In the case of a strong eavesdropper, we
identified certain situations of channel statistics that are either most favorable
or detrimental for the legitimate users. At the high SNR regime, we established
a sufficient condition that guarantees superior performance of the FD over
the HD mode. From a system designer viewpoint, the results provide insight
under which the FD can give certain gains over the conventional HD mode.
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Appendix A
Key Computation Parameters in (37) and (38)
We now provide the computation of parameters which are required to estab-
lish the key computations functions for HD and FD modes in sub-sections III-C1
and III-C2, respectively. Let σ2x := E
[
x2
]
, σ2y := E
[
y2
]
, σyx := E
[
xy
]
and σ2
y|x :=
E
[
y2|x]. The results are obtained under the condition that Σ−1
z
, Σ−1
z|x and σ
−2
y|x
exist in both modes.
1) HD mode
In HD mode the parameters σ2x, σ
2
y and σyx are given by
σ2x = σ
2
y = 1 + snr,
σyx = snr δρba.
Next we compute the parameters
∥∥∥bHDx ∥∥∥2 and ∥∥∥eHDx ∥∥∥2 as follows. Starting from (32)
and (34a), we get
∥∥∥bHDx ∥∥∥2 = σ
2
yxσ
−2
y
σ2x − σyxσ−2y
=
snr2 δ2ρ2
ba
(1 + snr)2 − snr2 δ2ρ2
ba
. (54)
Similarly, we can compute the parameters
∥∥∥eHDx ∥∥∥2 as follows. From (31) and (34b),
we get
∥∥∥eHDx ∥∥∥2 = σ
T
zxΣ
−1
z
σzx
σ2x − σTzxΣ−1z σzx
, (55)
where
Σz =

1 + snrae
√
snrae snrbeρe
√
snrae snrbeρe 1 + snrbe
 , (56)
σzx =
√
snr

√
snraeρae
√
snrbeρbe
 . (57)
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Then plugging in the values of (56) and (57) in (55) we get
∥∥∥eHDx ∥∥∥2 = NHD(1 + snr) [(1 + snrae)(1 + snrbe) − snrae snrbe ρ2e ] −NHD , (58)
where NHD := snr(1+snrbe) snrae ρ
2
ae+snr(1+snrae) snrbe ρ
2
be
−2 snrae snrbe snrρaeρbeρe.
2) FD mode
In FD mode the parameters σ2x, σ
2
y and σyx are given by
σ2x = σ
2
y = 1 + snr(1 + α
2),
σyx = snr δρba.
Next, we compute the parameters
∥∥∥bFDx ∥∥∥2 and ∥∥∥eFDx ∥∥∥2 as follows. Starting from (32)
and (34a), we get
∥∥∥bFDx ∥∥∥2 = snr
2 ρ2
ba
(1 + snr(1 + α2))2 − snr2 ρ2
ba
. (59)
Similarly, we can compute the parameters
∥∥∥eHDx ∥∥∥2 as follows. From (31) and (34b),
we get
∥∥∥eFDx ∥∥∥2 = NFD[1 + snr(1 + α2)] (1 + snrae + snrbe +2√snrae snrbeρe) −NFD , (60)
where NFD = snr(
√
snraeρae+
√
snrbeρbe)2, Σz = 1+snrae + snrbe +2
√
snrae snrbeρe
and σzx =
√
snr snraeρae +
√
snr snrbeρbe.
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